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Abstract. I argue that the conjunction of perdurantism (the view that objects are temporally
extended) and universalism (the thesis that any old class of things has a mereological fusion)
gives rise to undesired complications when combined with certain plausible assumptions
concerning the semantics of tensed statements.
1. Introduction
Perdurantism is the view that objects are temporally extended. An object, on this
view, has spatial as well as temporal parts, or stages, and to say of an object that
it persists through time is to say that it has different parts that exist at different
times.1 Typically (though not necessarily) this view goes hand in hand with the
principles of classical extensional mereology. In particular, perdurantism is
usually associated with universalism, i.e., with the thesis that any old class of
things has a mereological fusion—something composed of just those things.2
This combination of perdurantism and universalism may strike some as absurd,
for it yields all sorts of unheard-of gerrymandered things lacking any spatial or
temporal cohesion. Others, however, find the combination appealing, among
other reasons because perdurantism provides a straightforward solution to the
puzzles of diachronic identity (for example) while universalism allows one to
stay away from the sands of ontological indeterminacy (queerness comes in
degrees, but existence doesn’t). In fact, perdurantism cum u iversalism is the
ideal recipe for a deflationist Quinean ontology. There is an object for each re-
gion of space-time—says the theory—never mind whether we are accustomed
or willing to speak or think about it.3
I like this view, but there are complications. In the following I argue that
one complication arises as soon as the view is combined with certain plausible
assumptions concerning the semantics of tensed statements—specifically the
semantics of statements involving quantifiers and other variable binders. The
2complications are not irresolvable. But the solution—I am afraid—fails to meet
the standards of Quinean straightforwardness that characterizes other aspects of
the perdurantism-cumuniversalism theory (henceforth: the PU-theory).
2. Perdurantist Semantics
Here are the plausible assumptions I have in mind concerning the semantics of
tensed statements. First, on the PU-theory names and predicates are interpreted
as usual, i.e., as objects and relations defined on a fixed universe of discourse.
In particular, assuming for simplicity that the world we live in has three spatial
dimensions, an ordinary name such as ‘Pavarotti’ will designate a four-dimen-
sional worm and an ordinary predicate such as ‘tenor’ will pick out a class of
such worms, or parts thereof (including lower-dimensional parts if these are
admitted at all—e.g., instantaneous parts that do not literally extend over time or
boundary parts that do not literally extend over all three spatial dimensions.4) If
the copula is understood tenslessly, therefore, an atomic statement such as
(1) Pavarotti is a tenor
will presumably be false. For it would be true if and only if the referent of the
name ‘Pavarotti’ were in the extension of the predicate ‘tenor’, which pre-
sumably is not the case. (Not all of Pavarotti is a tenor; only his later stages
are.) This is not implausible, however, because in addition to this first general
semantic assumption the PU-theory also relies on an important assumption
about tensed statements. In fact, one advantage of the PU-theory is precisely
that it can deal with such statements in a plausible and straightforward way,
without any need to “go modal” or to relativize properties and rela ons to
times.5 This second assumption is that a tensed statement of the form
(2) x was/is/will be P.
is to be analyzed as:
(3) There is a past/present/future time t such that x is P at t.6
And for a perdurantist this amounts to the following:
(4) There is a past/present/future time t such that the t-part of x (exists
and)7 is P.
3Once this second assumption is taken into account, a statement such as (1) can
indeed be recognized as true, for it is true on a tensed reading of the copula:
(5) There is a present time  such that the t-part of Pavarotti is a tenor,
i.e., effectively:
(6) The present stage of Pavarotti is a tenor.
Likewise, tensed statements such as
(7) Pavarotti was a child
(8) Pavarotti was a turnip
will be true and false, respectively; for there exists some past temporal stage of
Pavarotti that is (tenslessly) a child but there exists no such stage that is a tur-
nip.
What about non-atomic statements? Truth-functional compounds pose no
problems; but what about tensed statements involving quantifiers? Here is
where a third plausible semantic assumption can be made. A statement of the
form:
(9) Someone was/is/will be P
is the existential generalization of (2):
(10) For some x: x was/is/will be P.
Hence on the PU-theory such a statement is naturally analyzed as the generali-
zation of (4):
(11) For some x: there is a past/present/future time t such that x is P at t,
i.e., effectively:
(12) For some x: there is a past/present/future time t such that the t-part of x
is P.
Thus, for instance, the truth conditions of a tensed statement such as
(13) Someone was/is/will be a tenor
are given by
4(14) For some x: there is a past/present/future time t such that the t-part of x
is a tenor.
In the past and present tenses, this statement is clearly true, for instance owing
to Pavarotti’s past and present temporal parts. And in the future tense the state-
ment might still be true, owing either to Pavarotti’s future parts or to those of
some other individual. The case of the universal quantifier is similar.
3. The Many Tenors
Now enter universalism. A universalist dr wsno ontological distinction be-
tween acceptable and unacceptable mereological fusions: some fusions may
seem uniform and homogeneous while others may seem awfully odd and ger-
rymandered, but for a universalist such differences ar  not r levant when it
comes to existence. Any fusion of a class of things is itself an existing thing.
Thus, in particular, a perdurantist universalist draws no ontological distinc-
tion between homogeneous, temporally continuous wholes and scattered fu-
sions of arbitrarily selected temporal parts. If the parts exist, they constitute a
whole, for the whole is nothing over and above the parts. (“They just are it; it
just is them.”8) When combined with the above semantics, however, this yields
troubles.
Consider the statements
(15) Some tenor was a child.
(16) Some tenor was a turnip.
Intuitively we take (15) to be true and (16) false, as with (7) and (8). Yet inspec-
tion shows that both statements are true on the PU-theory. For both have the
form:
(17) Some P was Q
which gets analyzed as:
(18) For some x: the present part of x is P and there is a past time  such
that the t-part of x is Q.
And if universalism indeed holds, statements of this form are true whenever the
extension of ‘P’  includes some present stages and the extension of ‘Q’  in-
5cludes some past stages, i.e., things whose temporal extent lies entirely in the
past of the time of utterance. It does not matter how disparate such stages are. If
there is at least one present stage x1 th t falls into the extension of ‘P’ and at
least one past stage x2 that falls into the extension of ‘Q’, then the mereological
fusion of x1 and x2 is sure to be an x that satisfies both conjuncts in (18):
(19) The present part of x is P.
(20) There is a past time t such that the t-part of x is Q.
Hence such a fusion is a P that was Q. In particular, since there are in fact
present stages falling into the extension of ‘tenor’ (Pavarotti’s is  case in
point) and there are past stages falling into the extension of ‘child’ as well as
past stages falling into the extension of ‘turnip’, universalism implies the
existence of a tenor that was a child as well as the existence of a tenor that was a
turnip.
This outcome is, of course, unpalatable. Pavarotti has never been a turnip.
Domingo has never been a turnip. None of the tenors we can think of has ever
been a turnip, so in a way every reasonable substitution instance of (16) is false.
Yet (16) is true. It is true by virtue of things that have no place in our ordinary
picture of the world and for which we have no names, but which the PU-theory
countenances nonetheless—tenor-turnips. And a theory that makes (16) true
under such circumstances—it could be objected—is hardly acceptable. (Notice
that there is no immediate spatial analogue of this problem. The mereological
fusion of the present stage of Pavarotti and the present stage of your favorite
turnip exists and you may call it a tenor-turnip, if you will.9 But it is neither a
tenor nor a turnip. For such predicates can truly be predicated of a temporal
part only if they apply to the corresponding spatial whole; they can be predi-
cated of a certain temporal stage only if they apply to it in its entirety.10)
The outcome is especially unpalatable insofar as it metastasizes rapidly.
If existential statements that are intuitively false come out true because of some
unheard-of tenor-turnip, then universal statements that are intuitively true will
come out false—as with
(21) Every tenor was a child.
In fact, every variable binder is going to behave wildly. For instance, because all
existentials of the form (17) are true as long as there are present Ps and past
Qs, it is clear that definite descriptions are going to violate the relevant unique-
6ness conditions even when they intuitively satisfy them. So, suppose that Pava-
rotti was once transformed, for a short period of time, into a tomato. Then we
might want to refer to him by the description ‘The tenor who was a tomato’ or
‘the tenor-tomato’. Yet these descriptions would certainly be inadequate, as
Pavarotti would only be one tenor-tomato among very many others (defined
along the lines illustrated above).11
4. Ways Out
There are, as far as I can see, two main ways out available to the PU-theorist.
The first way out exploits a revisionist strategy. The predicate ‘tenor’ in (16), it
might be said, is operating in more than just a predicative role. Being a tenor
requires more than simply having a temporal tenor part (just as it implies more
than simply having a spatial tenor part—consider again the mereological fusion
of Pavarotti and your favorite turnip). So the logical form of a statement such as
(16)—it might be said—is not (17) but rather somethingalong t e lines of
(22) Some person that is P was Q.
This would force the satisfier of (19) and (20) to be an x hat falls into the ex-
tension of ‘person’, and plausibly there is no such xwhen P is ‘tenor’ and Q is
‘turnip’. More generally, every statement that prima facie has the form (17)
would have to be re-interpreted as involving sortal restrictions of some sort:
(23) Some R that is P was Q.
Likewise for the other quantificational phrases. If this is properly done, then the
existence of tenor-turnips becomes irrelevant. Such entities exist—the PU-
theorist can say—but they are not the ones we are talking about when we make
statements such as (16) and the like.
The second way out invokes pragmatic ambiguity. The PU-theorist can
say that the conflict of intuitions caused by statements such as (15) and (16)
hinges on an underlying conflict between a restricted and an unrestricted inter-
pretation of the quantifiers. When speaking with the quantifiers wide open we
must admit that there is beer; but we might want to restrict our quantifiers and
say that there is no beer, meaning that there is no beer in the refrigerator. Like-
wise, when speaking with the quantifiers wide open the PU-theorist recognizes
the existence of all sorts of unheard-of things, including trout-turkeys and
7tenor-turnips. These may not be any sort of entities that we are willing to pick
out by means of a name, a demonstrative, or a definite description. They may
not even be entities about which we are willing to say anything at all. But if the
PU-theory holds then such entities exist. Hence the strict truth of (16) must be
recognized along with that of (15). On the other hand, this need not be a prob-
lem because the PU-theorist is happy to acknowledge our natural inclination to
quantify subject to restrictions. She is happy to acknowledge that we may want
to talk about some things while ignoring others—that we might want to talk
only about ordinary, much-heard-of things such as Pavarotti while ignoring
queer, unheard-of things such as tenor-turnips. In this sense, the PU-theorist
will recognize the falsity of (16) against the truth of (15). But this opposition is
eminently pragmatic. Context supplies the relevant clues and context supplies
the relevant criteria for distinguishing between things to be considered and
things to be ignored—hence between quantificational statements to be taken at
face value and statements to be taken restrictedly. Ontologically, however, (15)
and (16) are on a par.
5. Warm Beer
Are these options good? The first way out would be good if it could be prop-
erly carried out. Yet a proper implementation of this strategy presupposes a full
semantic network to be available which specifies, for each predicate P, the sort l
R that operates the necessary selection of candidates. This may be readily avail-
able in some cases, as when P is the predicate ‘tenor’. But it seems unwar-
ranted to assume that there is a sortal available for every predicate. And why
should a PU-theorist build such presumptions into the analysis of natural lan-
guage statements? Why should one make logical form depend on lexical se-
mantics or meaning postulates? Besides, there seems to be a difficulty in identi-
fying a ground level of analysis here. For doesn’t our problem crop up with the
sortal predicates themselves? Consider:
(24) Some person was a turnip.
On the face of it, (24) would seem to be true for the same reasons as (16). So
we would have to analyze (24) along the same lines:
(25) Some person that is a person was a turnip.
8And this seems to give rise to an obvious regress problem. (Perhaps this diffi-
culty could be avoided if ‘person’ were construed as a maximal concept, so that
no person could have persons—let alone turnips—as proper temporal parts.12
But note that this assumption would have to be made for every sortal predicate
R involved in the analysis displayed in (23). And it would call for further, con-
troversial semantic details—for instance to explain the truth conditions of
statements of the form ‘x is R at t’ when x is temporally extended, R expresses
a maximal concept, and t is an instant or a period of time properly included in
the temporal extent of x.)
The second way out is safer. We can definitely say that our conflict of in-
tuitions in cases such as these hinges on an underlying conflict between re-
stricted and unrestricted interpretations of the quantifiers. But this s not quite a
comfortable position, either. For it makes the semantics of quantified statements
depend heavily on local context and unprincipled intuitions. We are used to ap-
pealing to context when it comes to the semantics of predicates and singular
terms involving vagueness, ambiguity, multiplicity of reference. We may even
appeal to it when it comes to some quantificational phrases, as when we ask for
some beer. But it is odd that the logical business of variable binding should al-
ways require a similar treatment, and as a matter of necessity.
It might be thought that perhaps one could combine the two strategies by
putting the burden of the restriction on the predicates rather than on the quanti-
fiers. One might insist that, for certain P and Q, nothing satisfying a formula
such as (19) can also satisfy (20)—for instance, nothing that was once a turnip
can now be a tenor, for only temporal parts of persons can be tenors. However,
for a PU-theorist such an option is not available—even assuming the complica-
tion mentioned a  (24) to be solved. For the perdurantist wants to say that tem-
poral parts allow us to stick to ordinary predication. This was the gist of the
semantics outlined in Section 2. If a thing x has a property P at a time t it is be-
cause it has a certain temporal part—its t-part—that has P impliciter. Pavarotti
is a tenor now but was not a tenor when he was a child. So there must be a
proper temporal part of Pavarotti that is a tenor simpliciter, just as there must be
a proper temporal part that is a child simpl citer. And if we have got such parts,
universalism allows us to combine them with anything else, whether or not the
outcome is a person. For a PU-theorist there is no way to implement the intui-
tion that only temporal parts of persons can be tenors, since whatever is a tem-
poral part of a person is ipso facto a temporal part of a congeries of unheard-of
9things which overlap that person—including some whose temporal par s in-
clude turnips.13
The only option for the PU-theorist, then, is to put the burden of the re-
striction on the quantifiers, and to construe it as a context-dependent pragmatic
phenomenon. Normally—the PU-theory must say—when we assert hat no
tenor has ever been a turnip we are not speaking with our quantifiers wide open.
Really there have been and there are such tenors. But they are not the tenors
that would first come to mind. They are not the ones we call by name. They are
tenors that we normally tend to ignore—like the warm beer that nobody cares
about.14
Notes
1 The term ‘perdurantism’ is from Lewis [4, p. 202]. Other defenders of the view in-
clude Quine [8], Heller [1], Jubien [3], Hudson [2], and Sider [10]. The contrary (“received”)
view, according to which objects persist by existing wholly and completely at each of several
times, is termed ‘endurantism’.
2 See e.g. Lewis [4, pp. 211f], Heller [1, pp. 49f], Hudson [2, pp. 105ff], Sider [10,
pp. 121ff]. The term ‘universalism’ is from Van Inwagen [13, p. 74]. Lewis speaks of ‘unre-
stricted composition’ and Heller of the ‘fusion principle’; other authors still prefer ‘conjunc-
tivism’ [12] or ‘general sum principle’ [11].
3 See e.g. [9, p. 171].
4 I shall not consider issues relating to such options here. Similarly, below I shall
speak of “times” generically, covering both instants and extended periods.
5 See [7] for a recent articulation of this point.
6 By ‘a present time’ I mean any interval of time that overlaps the time of utterance,
including the present instant if instants are admitted at all.
7 Henceforth, I shall drop this qualification as I shall assume definite descriptions such
as ‘the t-part of ...’ to be analyzed in Russellian fashion.
8 Strictly speaking this is a further assumption to the effect that mereology is exten-
sional. But the idea that the fusion is nothing “over and above” the parts is one of the guid-
ing motivations for universalism (see [14]).
9 This is the sense in which Lewis [5, p. 80] speaks of trout-turkeys.
10 And the problem seems to arise only with respect to such predicates (as opposed to
predicates such as ‘stained’ or ‘scratched’, which can be true of a whole object even if they
apply only to some of its parts). For the same reason, the problem exemplified by (16) does
not arise on the endurantist view, even in the presence of universalism. Construed as a (dis-
continuous) enduring entity, the mereological fusion of a 19th century turnip and a 20th cen-
tury tenor is neither a turnip nor a tenor.
11 More generally, the problem concerns the semantics of numerical statements, such
as ‘There are n tenors’ or ‘At most n tenors are Italian’.
12 See e.g. [2, p. 117].
10
13 A related complication, familiar from Quine [8, pp. 622f], is that the PU-theorist
has no obvious way of accounting for how it is that different speakers ever manage to be
thinking of (or to refer to) the same four-dimensional worm when many suitable candidates
are available. This complication, however, may be construed as an instance the more general
problem of semantic (or pragmatic) indeterminacy, for which a supervaluational semantics
suggests itself (as in [1] or [6]).
14 Thanks to Andrea Borghini, Hud Hudson, Matthew Slater, and the referees for the
Australasian Journal of Philosophy for helpful discussion and comments on earlier drafts.
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